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Abstract
Innovative forms of deliberative democracy are gaining traction in governing responses to climate change in Europe and
beyond. Proponents of deliberative democracy have drawn attention to its particular suitability for shaping responses to
environmental challenges. Citizen engagement and participation is also a prominent feature of the European Green Deal.
This article considers the relationship between turbulence and deliberative democracy in the context of climate transi‐
tions, exploring when and how such democratic innovations are likely to generate turbulence in the governance of climate
transitions. A framework is developed that focuses on three important sets of characteristics of deliberative mini‐publics
(DMPs): (a) the nature of their formalmandates and theways inwhich climate change is framed as a policy problem; (b) the
nature of participation and the degree to which the participants are empowered to shape the deliberative processes in
which they participate; and (c) the degree to which DMPs are coupled with relevant policymaking processes. This frame‐
work is used to explore two recent and high‐profile cases of a particular type of DMP: citizens’ assemblies in Ireland and
France. The article contributes to the literatures on turbulent governance and deliberative democracy by reflecting on key
dimensions of DMPs from the analytical perspective of turbulent governance.
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1. Introduction
Citizen engagement, participation, and deliberation are
prominent features of the European Green Deal (EGD).
The Commission’s 2019 EGD communication articulates
its aim as being “to transform the EU into a fair and
prosperous society, with a modern, resource‐efficient
and competitive economy where there are no net emis‐
sions of greenhouse gases in 2050 and where economic
growth is decoupled from resource use” (European
Commission, 2019, p. 2). A European Climate Pact—
a central element of the EGDproposal—aims to “build on
the Commission’s on‐going series of citizens’ dialogues
and citizens’ assemblies across the EU, and the role
of social dialogue committees” (European Commission,
2019, p. 23).
The importance of citizen participation in the EGD
and, more broadly, in the transition to a climate neu‐
tral and resilient future, is driven at least in part by the
need to ensure that justice and fairness are placed at the
centre of the transition. The costs and benefits of transi‐
tion are distributed in deeply unequal ways across space
and time, as are existing opportunities to participate in
shaping climate transitions. The European Commission’s
EGD communication notes prominently that the envis‐
aged transition must be:
Just and inclusive. It must put people first, and pay
attention to the regions, industries and workers who
will face the greatest challenges. Since it will bring
substantial change, active public participation and
confidence in the transition is paramount if policies
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are to work and be accepted. (European Commission,
2019, p. 1)
Against this backdrop, innovative forms of deliberative
democracy are gaining traction in governing responses
to climate change. This phenomenon forms part of
a broader “deliberative wave” (OECD, 2020) in which
the use of deliberative processes is growing in preva‐
lence and prominence across countries and policy areas.
Building on a longer line of scholarship advocating delib‐
erative democracy (e.g., Dryzek, 1990; Fishkin, 1991),
proponents of deliberative democracy have drawn atten‐
tion to its particular suitability for shaping responses to
environmental challenges, which are characterised by
conflicting interests, values and worldviews, complexity,
trade‐offs, and long‐time horizons that stretch beyond
one electoral cycle (e.g., Blue, 2015; Niemeyer, 2013;
Smith, 2003; Stevenson & Dryzek, 2014). Rather than
simply aggregating atomized preferences of the popula‐
tion through elections or opinion polling, the process of
deliberation can serve to transform the preferences of
participants by exposing them to a wide variety of views
and engaging them in conversation with those whose
views they may not share. Niemeyer (2013) argues that
deliberative forums enable participating citizens to con‐
sider the interest of non‐human agents, and that delib‐
eration has the potential to attune participants to com‐
plexity as well as to take a long‐term view on global envi‐
ronmental issues.
Within the broader field of deliberative democracy,
a significant literature has developed around the use of
so‐called “deliberative mini‐publics” (DMPs), defined by
Goodin and Dryzek (2006, p. 220) as democratic innova‐
tions involving ordinary citizens in “groups small enough
to be genuinely deliberative, and representative enough
to be genuinely democratic.” According to Farrell et al.
(2019), DMPs are characterised by two core design fea‐
tures: (a) they are deliberative in the sense that partic‐
ipants reach conclusions having received relevant infor‐
mation and engaged in a careful and open discussion;
and (b) they are representative in that participants are
selected to be representative, as far as possible, of the
wider population.
The broader political and social landscape presents
challenges for climate transitions. Brexit, the Covid‐19
pandemic, and in a climate context resistance from cen‐
tral and easternmember states to ambitious policy agen‐
das, as well as a widespread perception that democracy
is in crisis (Norris & Inglehart, 2019) all complicate the
pathway for implementation of the EGD. Populist back‐
lash has been increasingly evident in a range of west‐
ern democracies, with action on climate change drawing
particularly strong critique for being an elitist or unjust
project. The concept of turbulent governance has been
used to capture the accumulation of challenges (Ansell &
Trondal, 2018; see also Dobbs et al., 2021). Turbulence is
distinguished from crisis in the sense that it is a normal
and enduring feature of the contemporary governance
landscape—a condition or a dysfunction—and as some‐
thing to be managed or withstood.
The aim of this article is to situate the growth in
DMPs for framing climate transitions within the context
of turbulent governance. Such democratic innovations
can be seen as either a response to turbulent governance
or as a cause of turbulence in the broader climate gov‐
ernance landscape. In this context, this article focuses
more narrowly on DMPs as a cause of turbulence in cli‐
mate change governance. It connects the concept of tur‐
bulent governance to the literature on DMPs and seeks
to answer the question: To what extent and under what
conditions can DMPs lead to turbulence in the gover‐
nance of climate transitions?
The article distinguishes three key characteristics of
DMPs: (a) the nature of their formal mandates and the
ways in which climate change is framed as a policy prob‐
lem; (b) the nature of participation and the degree to
which the participants are empowered to shape the
deliberative processes in which they participate; and
(c) the degree to which DMPs are coupled with relevant
policymaking processes. These characteristics are then
used as a framework to explore two recent and high‐
profile cases of a particular type of DMP: citizens’ assem‐
blies focused on climate change conducted in EU mem‐
ber states, namely the Irish Citizens’ Assembly, which
deliberated on climate change along with four other
topics, and the French Citizens Convention for Climate
(Convention Citoyenne pour le Climat).
The article proceeds as follows: Section 2 sets out
the article’s case selection and approach. Section 3 intro‐
duces the concept of turbulent governance and relates
it to the literature on DMPs. Section 4 undertakes an
empirical analysis of the two selected cases mentioned
above to provide an analyticalmapping of emerging prac‐
tices. Section 5 discusses the findings and reflects on the
extent to which the two DMPs have led to turbulence
in the governance of climate transitions. Section 6 con‐
cludes and identifies broader lessons for climate transi‐
tions and the EGD.
2. Case selection and Approach
DMPs range in size from small processes such as citizens’
juries (typically 15–30 participants), citizens’ councils
(typically 15 participants), and consensus conferences
(typically 16 participants), to larger processes such as
citizens’ assemblies (typically 90–150 participants), cit‐
izens’ dialogues (typically 150 participants), and delib‐
erative surveys (typically more than 200 participants).
DMPs share certain features that distinguish them from
other forms of citizen participation (Brown, 2006; Farrell
et al., 2019): (a) They provide participants with access
to a range of relevant information on the topic in ques‐
tion and, importantly, provide adequate time and space
for participants to deliberate with their fellow citizens;
(b) they limit interest group representatives to partici‐
pation as expert group members and possible steering
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group members; (c) they feed into policy processes, but
they have no authority to make legally binding decisions;
and (d) they address both public officials and the gen‐
eral public. Mini‐publics are usually representative of the
“maxi‐public,” that is, the wider population from which
the participants are drawn.
The empirical focus in this article is more narrowly
on citizens’ assemblies, considered to be the most
robust and elaborate form of DMP (Escobar & Elstub,
2017). A range of European countries have implemented
national citizens’ assemblies focused, in part or in full,
on climate change, including Ireland, France, the UK,
Scotland, Denmark, Finland, and Germany. A range of
smaller scale deliberative processes have been imple‐
mented at city or local level, such as in the UK, Hungary,
and Poland. These processes exhibit significant national
variation in terms of their establishment, design, scope,
operation, outcomes, and impact.
The empirical analysis in Section 4 focuses on the
Irish Citizens’ Assembly, which deliberated on climate
change along with four other topics, and the French
Citizens Convention for Climate. Both fulfil the core crite‐
ria of DMPs set out in the introduction, namely that they
were deliberative and representative, involved extended
deliberation on the topic of climate change, and con‐
sisted of representative random samples of the national
population. The French and Irish cases were selected for
analysis furthermore on the basis that, at the time of
writing, enough time has elapsed to be able to begin
to analyse their relationship with the broader policy sys‐
tem and the extent to which they can be considered a
cause of turbulence in climate transitions. The empiri‐
cal analysis draws on publicly available sources and exist‐
ing research—including that conducted by the author
on the Irish case—regarding the design, implementation,
and outcomes of these two national citizens’ assemblies.
Rather than conducting new empirical research, the aim
of the analysis is to explore the plausibility of the analyt‐
ical framework and open new avenues for research.
3. Turbulent Governance and Deliberative Mini‐Publics
in the Context of Climate Transitions
Turbulence provides a useful conceptual entry point to
analysing the role of DMPs in the context of the EGD.
Ansell and Trondal (2018, p. 53) define turbulence as “sit‐
uations where events, demands, and support interact
in highly variable, inconsistent, unexpected and unpre‐
dictable ways.” Elsewhere they characterise turbulence
as the “increasingly volatile context for complex problem‐
solving” (Ansell et al., 2020, p. 3). Ansell and Trondal
(2018, p. 46) distinguish between three types of turbu‐
lence: (a) organisational turbulence, which covers tur‐
bulence within organisations themselves; (b) environ‐
mental turbulence, which includes sources of turbulence
from the broader environment; and (c) scalar turbulence,
which includes the turbulence caused by activities at
one governance level that spill over to another level
such as when policy solutions at one level create prob‐
lems at another. In another contribution to this thematic
issue, Dobbs et al. (2021) suggest the need to expand
the conceptualisation of turbulence developed by Ansell
and colleagues to include policy turbulence, which they
define as “where there is substantial policy conflict or
incoherence, e.g., due to multiple related policies in con‐
flict, a substantive policy gap, or potentially a new policy
that is exceptionally innovative or overhauls the regime”
(Dobbs et al., 2021, p. 319)
How does turbulence manifest itself in the gover‐
nance of climate transitions? Elsewhere in this thematic
issue, Dobbs et al. (2021) develop the concept of tur‐
bulence in the context of the EGD. Brexit, the Covid‐19
pandemic, Euroscepticism, political upheaval in member
states, and the broader international landscape can all
be identified as sources of environmental turbulence for
the EGD. Moreover, the EGD itself is a potential source
of turbulence, since it entails significant and potentially
disruptive changes across a wide range of policy arenas.
In terms of organisational turbulence, examples include
reforms within the European Commission such as the
creation of DG Clima as well as the challenges faced in
the appointment of a newCommission president in 2019.
For scalar turbulence, the multilevel character of the EU
governance system and particularly the fact that many
of the areas of relevance to the EGD are shared com‐
petences between the Union and member state levels
increase the prospects of scalar turbulence.
How can we situate the relationship between DMPs
and turbulent governance in the context of climate tran‐
sitions? As a form of institutional innovation, DMPs can
be conceptualised as both a response to turbulence and
themselves a cause of turbulence. By opening up chan‐
nels for citizen participation, DMPs can potentially serve
as a response to environmental turbulence such as perva‐
sive distrust of political institutions, disinformation and
rising Euroscepticism (Norris & Inglehart, 2019). In the
case of the scale of transformative change envisaged in
the EGD, DMPs can serve as institutional mechanisms
to engage diverse publics—including marginalised and
hard‐to‐reach sections of society. DMPs can also them‐
selves be a cause of turbulence. If their recommenda‐
tions push the boundaries of what is deemed to be politi‐
cally feasible or acceptable, theymay be a source of envi‐
ronmental turbulence if they disrupt established interest
groups or the political status quo. They may also serve
as sources of policy turbulence or scalar turbulence by
proposing recommendations that disrupt the status quo
in other policy arenas or at other scales of governance.
The focus of this article is on DMPs as a source
of turbulence in the governance of climate transitions.
Whether and to what extent this is the case is likely to
be shaped by their specific institutional characteristics
as well as the broader context in which they are com‐
missioned and operate. Here, I identify three key char‐
acteristics of DMPs that I suggest shape the degree to
which DMPs may be a cause of turbulence in climate
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governance: (a) the nature of their formal mandates and
the range of information and material to which partic‐
ipants are given access; (b) the nature of participation
and the degree towhich the participants are empowered
to shape the deliberative processes in which they partici‐
pate; and (c) the degree to which DMPs are coupled with
relevant policymaking processes.
3.1. Mandate and Framing
A first important characteristic in terms of turbulent gov‐
ernance is the mandate of the DMP and how the topic
is framed. According to a recent OECD report, the ques‐
tion for deliberation ought to be broad enough to allow
for numerous possible recommendations, but not so
broad as to lead to side‐tracking (OECD, 2020, p. 85).
Deliberative processes arguably work best when framed
around a distinct, specific policy question that needs to
be answered (Devaney, Brereton, et al., 2020). Narrower
framings can facilitate clear results over shorter time‐
frames, whereas broader framings can incorporate a
wider range of topics but may be slower and produce
less clear‐cut recommendations (Bryant & Stone, 2020).
Other things being equal, more specific recommenda‐
tions are harder to ignore and therefore are more likely
to generate turbulence in the wider governance system.
A related characteristic concerns the way in which cli‐
mate change is framed as a policy problem in the context
of a DMPs. The deliberative process is underpinned by
the provision of relevant information on the topic under
consideration, and usually involves an overview of the
topic and diagnosis of the problem at hand, followed
by more detailed information and outlining of possible
solutions (Gerwin, 2018). As Capstick et al. (2020) argue,
there is no “neutral” way of framing climate change.
Diversity of information sources is important, as is giv‐
ing participants control over which sources and types of
information they wish to access (newDemocracy, 2019).
The greater the range of information sources, the less
constrained is the nature and content of this information
by dominant interests and perspectives, and the greater
the control that participants have over the material to
which they are exposed, the more potentially transfor‐
mative and disruptive the DMP may be.
3.2. Agency of Participants
Who participates in a DMP and to what degree the par‐
ticipants themselves are provided with opportunities to
shape the processes in which they participate constitute
another important set of characteristics with respect
to turbulent governance. The representativeness and
inclusiveness of DMPs are key factors in the legitimacy
of these processes (Olsen & Trenz, 2016; Pow, 2021).
Some models of deliberation such as enclave deliber‐
ation emphasise the benefits of dedicated forums for
disempowered groups (Brown, 2006; Karpowitz et al.,
2009), but DMPs are characterised by random selection
that gives each member of the public an equal chance of
participation. This can take the form of “pure” random
selection and stratified random selection in which the
sample reflects important characteristics of the wider
population such as gender, age, socio‐economic status,
ethnicity, geography, etc. (Farrell et al., 2019). The size
of the process is also an important characteristic, partic‐
ularly for stratified sampling: The larger the number, the
more likely it is to capture important demographic char‐
acteristics of the wider population.
The degree to which participants in a DMP are
empowered to shape the process is an important cross‐
cutting characteristic. One aspect of this concerns the
mandate and information to which participants are
exposed. The greater the scope for participants them‐
selves to share these aspects of the process, the more
potentially transformative the process and its outputs
may be. A further important dimension concerns the
decision‐making procedures used to arrive at outputs,
and what form those outputs should take, for example a
series of recommendations on which the members vote,
a narrative report, or some other form.
3.3. Policy Coupling and Integration
The degree to which a DMP is coupled with the broader
policy system is an important institutional character‐
istic in terms of its potential to generate turbulence
for the wider governance system. One relevant institu‐
tional characteristic concerns the commissioning author‐
ity. A DMP can be commissioned by government, by civil
society, or by another entity such as an academic insti‐
tution. We can distinguish further between commission
by the executive and legislative branches of government.
DMPs commissioned by policymakers are likely to be
more tightly coupled to the policymaking process (Setälä,
2017; Thompson, 2019). Farrell et al. (2019) advocate for
an independent chair and professional secretariat, and
that DMPs should be kept at arm’s length from govern‐
ment thereby maintaining a credible level of indepen‐
dence and allowing for citizen‐led approaches to design‐
ing the agenda and process.
Another important dimension of policy coupling con‐
cerns the outputs of a DMP and how those outputs are
integrated into the wider policymaking process. This is
among the most challenging dimensions of DMPs from
both an analytical and practice perspective. There is no
consensus in the literature on this issue, with a recent
review by the OECD arguing that “research that links
the outcomes of these processes to citizens’ perceptions
of their trust, fairness, and effectiveness is also lacking”
(OECD, 2020, p. 165). Gerwin (2018) argues that DMP rec‐
ommendations should be binding, which was the case
for city‐level citizens’ assemblies held in Poland. In the
case of the British Columbia Citizens’ Assembly, the gov‐
ernment committed in advance to put the assembly’s
recommendations to a referendum (Bua, 2019; Setälä
& Smith, 2018), but many other scholars suggest that
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recommendations should not be binding. This, however,
creates the risk of cherry‐picking by decision‐makers
(Font et al., 2018). Farrell et al. (2019) recommend that
there should be clear guidelines in advance on how rec‐
ommendations will be dealt with.
The more empowered a DMP is in both of these
respects—in terms of the role of the participants in shap‐
ing the outputs and recommendations and the degree
of pre‐commitment to implementation—the more likely
the process is to generate turbulence for the wider pol‐
icy system. The broader political context is also an impor‐
tant factor. The prominence of climate change on the pol‐
icy agenda and the mobilisation of societal stakeholders
either in support of, or in opposition to, the outputs of a
DMP will shape the impact that such processes have on
the wider policy system.
Table 1 summarises the findings of the above dis‐
cussion, which has drawn attention to the importance
of mandates and framing, participation and agency, and
policy coupling in shaping the how DMPs relate to
turbulent governance in the context of climate transi‐
tions. DMPs with non‐specific mandates, in which the
participants are given limited scope to shape the pro‐
cess, and which are only loosely coupled and integrated
into broader policymaking processes are less likely to
cause turbulence in the governance of climate transi‐
tions. By contrast, DMPs that address specific mandates,
give participants a strong role in shaping the process,
and are tightly coupledwith broader policy processes are
more likely to be a source of turbulence for the broader
governance landscape. The next section uses the frame‐
work developed in this section to structure an analysis
of two of the most high‐profile climate‐focused national
DMPs to date, in Ireland and France.
4. Deliberative Mini‐Publics and Climate Governance:
Evidence From the Irish and France Climate Assemblies
The analysis in this section focuses on national level
citizens’ assemblies on climate change in Ireland
(2016–2018) and France (2019–2020). The analysis
focuses on two early examples of national‐level pro‐
cesses that fulfil the criteria of both DMPs and the nar‐
rower category of citizens’ assemblies. The discussion
below considers each case study, structuring the analy‐
sis around the framework developed in Section 3.
4.1. The Irish Citizens’ Assembly on Climate Change
In Ireland, a Citizens’ Assembly was established in 2016
to consider five topics, one of which was climate change.
It met on 12 occasions between October 2016 and April
2018. Its deliberations on climate change took place
over two weekends in September and November 2017.
The most high‐profile of the five topics—and the one
for which the assembly is arguably best known—was
the politically controversial topic of abortion. Climate
change was not part of its original remit as set out in the
parliamentary resolution providing for its establishment;
rather, it was added as a result of a Green Party amend‐
ment to the resolution (Devaney, Torney, et al., 2020).
The mandate of the Citizens’ Assembly on the topic
of climate change was exceptionally broad. This was set
out in the terms of reference, which were set down in a
resolution of both Houses of Parliament. The question to
be addressed with respect to climate change was “how
the State can make Ireland a leader in tackling climate
change” (Citizens’ Assembly, 2018, p. 48). No timeframe
(e.g., 2030 or 2050) was set out and there was no indica‐
tion of what being a “leader” might entail. This provided
an exceptionally broad canvas for the assembly and con‐
strained its ability to feed into specific climate policy pro‐
cesses. There was no mandate, for example, to shape
the country’s 2030 climate change targets or pathways
towards those targets, nor was there an opportunity to
shape a specific climate change policy framework such as
the state’s statutory National Mitigation Plan or National
Energy and Climate Plan.
The work programme divided the topic of climate
change into a broad overview of climate change science
and policy, sectoral consideration of energy, transport,
and agriculture, food and land use, aswell as a session on
international perspectives on climate leadership featur‐
ing contributions from Scotland and Denmark (Citizens’
Assembly, 2018, Chapter 3). The scope of the assembly
was constrained by the limited time devoted to the cli‐
mate change topic. While the assembly met for 12 week‐
ends in total over a period of 18 months, only two of
those meetings were devoted to the topic of climate
change. This included a total of 26 hours of listening, dis‐
cussion and deliberation, with presentations from 15 cli‐
mate change experts and six individuals championing low
carbon transition (Devaney, Torney, et al., 2020). Within
Table 1. Core characteristics of DMPs and their relevance for turbulence.
Design characteristics Characteristics likely to generate turbulence
Mandate and framing Specific vs. broad mandate Specific mandate
Constrained vs. unconstrained framing Unconstrained framing
Participation and agency Agency of participants Strong role for participants
Policy coupling and integration Commissioning authority and its role Independence from commissioning authority
Degree of pre‐commitment to High degree of pre‐commitment
implementation
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each sectoral section, this was limited to typically two
expert speakers, with no speakers invited from interest
groups such as business groups or NGOs. Separate cat‐
egories of speakers were identified: experts and “exem‐
plars” of climate action. The effect of this constraint was
to limit the breadth of evidence presented to the partici‐
pants, potentially therefore limiting the breadth of their
recommendations.
The assembly’s 99 participants were selected by ran‐
dom sample stratified by a range of demographic char‐
acteristics including age, gender, social class, and region
(Citizens’ Assembly, n.d.‐b). A steering group composed
of the chair, secretariat, and a representative group
of members provided a channel for members to pro‐
vide input to shaping the process (Citizens’ Assembly,
2018, Chapter 2). The extent to which the participants
were able to shape the process through this channel
is unclear. A draft ballot paper was prepared by the
chair and secretariat, with input from the expert advi‐
sory group and steering group, and then put to the full
membership for discussion and approval. Once the bal‐
lot paper was approved, voting on each of the 13 rec‐
ommendations was by secret ballot. All recommenda‐
tions were endorsed by 80% or more, including politi‐
cally contentious recommendations to increase the level
of an existing carbon tax, to place a tax on greenhouse
gas emissions from agriculture, and to end subsidies for
peat extraction (Citizens’ Assembly, 2018). The assem‐
bly’s recommendations became a focal point for pol‐
icy entrepreneurs, particularly within civil society, seek‐
ing to strengthen Ireland’s response to climate change.
Welcoming the formal publication of the assembly’s
report on climate change in April 2018, the Stop Climate
Chaos coalition hailed the recommendations as “a man‐
date for revolutionising Ireland’s climate policy” (Stop
Climate Chaos, 2018).
In terms of coupling and integration with the policy
process, the assembly was established by resolution
of both Houses of Parliament, but the commission‐
ing authority had no role in the running of the pro‐
cess. An independent secretariat composed of staff sec‐
onded from the Department of the Taoiseach (Prime
Minister) was tasked with supporting an independent
chair (retired Supreme Court Judge Mary Laffoy), who
was appointed by government to lead the process.
An expert advisory group was composed of experts
in climate change science and policy, and deliberative
democracy provided external advice to the chair and
secretariat. The resolution mandated the creation of a
special parliamentary committee to examine the assem‐
bly’s recommendations on only one of the five topics
under consideration, namely Ireland’s constitutional ban
on abortion. The parliamentary resolution establishing
the assembly required for the other four topics only
that parliamentwould respond to each recommendation
(Citizens’ Assembly, n.d.‐a). Despite not being required,
in the case of the climate change topic a similar model
to that required for follow‐up on the abortion topic
was adopted, and a special parliamentary committee
was established to consider the recommendations. This
special committee—the Joint Oireachtas (Parliamentary)
Committee on Climate Action—was established in July
2018. Over a period of approximately six months, the
committee considered the recommendations of the
assembly—in greater detail than the assembly had been
able to, a process that included calling a range of
expert witnesses.
The parliamentary committee published its own rec‐
ommendations inMarch 2019 (Houses of the Oireachtas,
2019). These recommendations largely amplified and
developed the assembly’s recommendations, including
developing the assembly’s recommendation to place
climate change at the centre of policymaking into a pro‐
posal to comprehensively revise the state’s 2015 frame‐
work climate law. This recommendation was subse‐
quently incorporated as the central climate governance
commitment of a government Climate Action Plan pub‐
lished in June 2019 (DCCAE, 2019). Following a lengthy
legislative process that was interrupted by a general
election in February 2020, the Climate Action and Low
Carbon Development (Amendment) Bill was signed into
law in July 2021. However, not all of the assembly’s rec‐
ommendations were implemented. The most significant
exception was the assembly’s recommendation to place
a GHG tax on emissions from agriculture. Accounting for
over one‐third of Ireland’s GHG emissions, the debate on
the role of the agriculture sector in addressing climate
change is particularly contentious. The assembly’s rec‐
ommendation was not endorsed by the parliamentary
committee, which recommended only that the topic be
given further consideration.
Taking a longer‐term perspective, the most conse‐
quential impact of the assembly’s recommendations
may turn out to be the revision of the climate law.
The amended climate law puts in place an enhanced
governance framework, with binding five‐year carbon
budgets and stronger accountability provisions. This
framework may indeed introduce significant turbulence
into the broader governance landscape, moving climate
change concerns closer to the centre of policymaking.
The broader context, including the publication of the
IPCC report on global warming of 1.5 degrees as well as a
rise in societal awareness of the climate crisis, illustrated
for example in the school strikes for climate, played a key
role in creating the conditions for these significant devel‐
opments. The assembly itself and its recommendations
are best characterised as an inspiration or spur that set
this process rather than its proximate cause.
4.2. The French Citizens Convention for Climate
The French Citizens Convention for Climate was widely
seen as a response to the gilets jaunes protests against
a rise in fuel tax (Eymard, 2020). An initial response to
the protests, the grand débat convened by President
Macron, convened 18 regional citizen conferences, each
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inviting about a hundred randomly selected citizens to
deliberate for a day and a half (Giraudet et al., 2021).
However, the grand débat was widely criticised as being
a smoke screen as well as for “not following the basic
standards of deliberation design” (Ehs & Mokre, 2021).
The Citizens Convention for Climate was formally initi‐
ated in July 2019 by a letter from the prime minister.
It convened for the first time in October 2019 and met
over seven 2.5‐day sessions between October 2019 and
June 2020.
In terms of its mandate, the convention was commis‐
sioned by the executive andwas taskedwith deliberating
on how to define a series of measures to achieve a reduc‐
tion of at least 40% in greenhouse gas emissions by 2030
(compared to 1990) in keepingwith the principle of social
justice (Citizens Convention for Climate, n.d.). As such, it
was a relatively specific mandate, with a defined time‐
frame (2030) and predefined level of ambition in terms
of the decarbonisation target (40%). The reference to
social justice stemmed from the convention’s origins in
the gilets jaunes protests. The specificity of the mandate
arguably provided greater scope for the convention to
contribute to near‐term climate action policies, though
how far the recommendations would go in delivering on
the 40% target was not quantified at the time (Giraudet
et al., 2021).
A wide range of speakers were invited, including
those considered to be neutral experts as well as those
invited to present a particular perspective. A review of
the convention conducted by a range of independent
researchers who observed the process argues that the
group of experts tasked with informing the participants
shaped the process and its recommendations (Giraudet
et al., 2021). According to this assessment, the way
in which the debates were structured by the organ‐
isers meant that experts and speakers with opposing
views were rarely given the opportunity to challenge
each other’s evidence. The assessment by the group of
observers also noted that the degree towhich the invited
experts shaped the deliberations varied across differ‐
ent thematic areas, but that overall it was significant
(Giraudet et al., 2021).
The convention consisted of 150 participants, who
were selected using stratified random sampling. These
participants were stratified in order to be represen‐
tative of the diversity of the French society on the
basis of socio‐demographic criteria: gender, age, level
of education, place of residence (urban, suburbs, rural,
etc.), geographical area (including overseas territories),
and socio‐professional category (Citizens Convention for
Climate, n.d.). The governance of the convention was
structured around five groups: (a) a governance com‐
mittee tasked with setting the agenda and rules, con‐
sisting of representatives of think tanks, trade unions,
business, government officials, and academics with rel‐
evant expertise; (b) A group of three guarantors nom‐
inated by the National Assembly, the Senate, and the
Economic, Social and Environmental Council; (c) a group
of 19 experts taskedwith providing technical background
on climate policies and technologies; (d) a group of six
legal experts tasked with providing feedback on the par‐
ticipants’ recommendations; and (e) a consortium of
deliberation facilitators.
According to Giraudet et al. (2021), the most distinc‐
tive feature of the French convention when compared
to other citizens’ assemblies on climate change was its
approach based on “co‐construction” between citizens
and experts. Citizens were split into five thematic work‐
ing groups: “consuming,” “travelling,” “housing,” “eat‐
ing,” and “producing and working.” Recommendations
were prepared by sub‐groups of the whole member‐
ship with support from the committee of legal experts
and specialists with expertise in decarbonisation (Saujot
et al., 2020, p. 6). In addition to the formal deliberations,
some of the members met with civil society and poli‐
cymakers outside of the formal process and organised
debates themselves, leading Saujot et al. (2020, p. 6) to
describe the process as “a co‐construction process by the
150 citizens in interaction with several groups of actors
both within and outside the convention.” Indeed, the
term “co‐construction” was included in the letter from
the prime minister commissioning the process.
In terms of policy coupling and integration, as noted
above, the convention was commissioned by the exec‐
utive branch of government. The Economic, Social and
Environmental Council was in charge of overseeing the
organisation of the event and of ensuring its indepen‐
dence, including that of the governance committee.
Nonetheless, it was strongly coupled with the policy sys‐
tem from the start by virtue of the fact that President
Macron committed to submitting the convention’s rec‐
ommendations “unfiltered” to a referendum or to parlia‐
ment, or to direct regulatory application (Eymard, 2020).
As Giraudet and colleagues note, the meaning and impli‐
cations of the “unfiltered” stipulation were never fully
clear. One interpretation placed an obligation on govern‐
ment to implement the recommendations regardless of
their content, but an alternative interpretation placed
an obligation on the convention to produce recom‐
mendations that were readily implementable (Giraudet
et al., 2021).
The convention’s recommendations consisted of 149
measures in total. Of these, three were selected by the
participants to be proposed for referendum. These were
two constitutional reforms and the recognition of eco‐
cide as a crime. In a speech delivered a week after
the publication of the convention’s recommendations,
President Macron committed to supporting 146 out of
149 of the recommendations but declined to accept
three, namely amending the preamble of the constitu‐
tion, imposing a 4% tax on corporate dividends, and
reducing speed limits on motorways (Giraudet et al.,
2021). In February 2021, the French government pub‐
lished the Climate and Resilience Bill as its response
to the convention’s recommendations. This bill was
judged by the Convention’s members themselves as an
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insufficient response (Huffpost, 2021). As the bill pro‐
gressed through the legislative process it was further
weakened. The final version, agreed by the National
Assembly and the Senate in July 2021 was criticised by
civil society as being inconsistent with the original rec‐
ommendations of the Convention (Bauer‐Babef, 2021).
Overall, the combination of a relatively tightly‐
defined mandate and a process that granted signifi‐
cant agency to the participants themselves through a
co‐created process provided the basis for a set of rec‐
ommendations that have the potential to create signif‐
icant turbulence in France’s climate governance land‐
scape. President Macron’s commitment in advance to
submit the convention’s recommendations “unfiltered”
to either a referendum, to parliament, or to direct regula‐
tory application created the possibility of significant tur‐
bulence, but it was revoked in the end. Macron rejected
three of the convention’s recommendations from the
start, and the implementing legislation lessened the
strength of others.
5. Discussion
This article has explored the conditions under which
democratic innovations such as DMPs are likely to cause
turbulence in the governance of climate transitions.
Drawing on the deliberative democracy literature, I iden‐
tified a set of DMP characteristics of relevance, centred
upon: (a) the nature of their formal mandates and the
ways in which climate change is framed as a policy prob‐
lem; (b) the degree towhich participants are empowered
to shape the deliberative processes in which they partici‐
pate; and (c) the degree to which DMPs are coupled with
relevant policymaking processes. Two recent national‐
level citizens’ assemblies have been discussed, focused
on climate change in Ireland and France to explore the
utility of this framework. The previous analysis shows
considerable diversity among these processes in respect
of all three categories across the two cases, which is sum‐
marised in Table 2.
In terms of mandates and framing, there was signif‐
icant variation. The French convention was given a rela‐
tively specific mandate, tasked with considering how to
achieve 40% decarbonisation by 2030 in a spirit of social
justice. By contrast, the mandate in the case of the Irish
citizens’ assembly was much more open‐ended, without
a specified timeframe or decarbonisation target. The cir‐
cumstances in which the two processes were established
varied. In the Irish case, climate changewas added to the
agenda of an assembly focused primarily on the topic of
abortion, almost as an after‐thought. In the French case,
by contrast, the convention was widely seen as a gov‐
ernment response to the Gilet jaunes protests against an
unpopular fuel tax.
The two assemblies also varied in terms of the agency
given to the participants themselves. The French con‐
vention operated in a co‐creative manner, with a com‐
paratively strong role for the participants themselves to
shape the process. The Irish assembly was, by contrast,
run in a way that did not give as much agency to the
participants. The manner in which the participants were
involved in designing (as opposed to merely voting on)
those outputs also differed.
In terms of policy coupling and integration, while
both processeswere commissioned by government, they
were governed in ways that were more or less at arms‐
length from government, though the arrangements dif‐
fered in each case. Each of the processes reported
to the commissioning branch of government, but the
degree of pre‐commitment by government to consid‐
ering the recommendations varied considerably. In the
Irish case, the assembly’s recommendationswere consid‐
ered by parliament, with little explicit pre‐commitment
except to consider them. By contrast, the French pres‐
ident pre‐committed to submitting the recommenda‐
tions “unfiltered” either to referendum or to parliament.
According to the expectations developed in Section 2,
the contrasting characteristics of the French and Irish
DMPs ought to have resulted in limited turbulence in the
Irish case and significant turbulence in the French case.
This is not how the story played out. In the Irish case,
albeit over a longer timeframe, the Citizens’ Assembly
resulted in significant policy turbulence, most notably
through a major overhaul of the 2015 climate law. In the
French case, by contrast, PresidentMacrondid not follow
through on this commitment to submit the Convention’s
recommendations “unfiltered” to a referendum, to par‐
liament, or to direct regulatory application. He rejected
three of the 149 recommendations from the start, and
the final version of the legislation designed to imple‐
ment the convention’s recommendations, the Climate
and Resilience Bill, has been criticised by civil society for
not going far enough to honour the spirit of those rec‐
ommendations. These findings point to the limitations of
Table 2. Characteristics of Irish Citizens’ Assembly and French Citizens Convention for Climate.
Design characteristics Irish Citizens’ Assembly French Citizens Convention for Climate
Mandate and framing Non‐specific mandate, constrained Specific mandate, less constrained framing
framing
Agency of participants Largely top‐down process Process co‐created with more agency given
to participants
Policy coupling and integration Loose coupling and integration Tighter coupling and integration
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focusing on the specific design characteristics of DMPs in
order to understand their likely impact. The findings also
emphasise the importance of context and contingency
in assessing their contributions to the governance of cli‐
mate transitions.
6. Conclusions
This article used the cases of the Irish Citizens’ Assembly
and French Citizens Convention for Climate to explore
when and how climate‐focused DMPs are likely to cause
turbulence in the governance of climate transitions.
The framework developed in Section 2 focused on cen‐
tral characteristics of DMPs, including their mandates
and framing, the degree of agency given to partici‐
pants, and the extent of policy coupling and integration.
The empirical analysis showed that these factors matter,
but that the broader context and contingent factors mat‐
ter as well—perhaps even more.
The contrasting fates of the two cases point to a ten‐
sion at the heart of the use of DMPs in climate change
governance that ought to be investigated through fur‐
ther research. To what extent is the disruptive and path‐
breaking potential of deliberative democratic innova‐
tions constrained by an inherent wariness on the part of
governments to delegating agency to bodies over which
they have limited control? Is there a trade‐off between
the degree of separation from government and the likeli‐
hood of follow‐up on recommendations? A more distant
relationship from the government may increase auton‐
omy and independence over agenda and operation, but
it may also result in government being less amenable to
implementing recommendations from a DMPs.
It is too early to form a definite assessment on these
questions, and future research ought to devote further
attention to this area. The question of broader impact of
DMPs is the least studied and understood in the litera‐
ture. It is also among the most important topics in this
field, and as more DMPs are implemented with varying
design characteristics, and asmore time passes, it will be
important to conduct follow‐up research to examine the
extent to which, and the conditions under which, such
processes shape the governance of climate transitions.
As discussed in the introduction, the EGD aims to ensure
a just transition by placing citizens at the centre of the
climate transition, including by building on the growing
experience of citizens’ dialogues and assemblies across
the EU. Given the scale of transformation across all sec‐
tors of economy and society envisaged as part of the
EGD, citizen participation will indeed be central to its suc‐
cess or failure. In this context, policymakers and schol‐
ars ought to learn lessons from high‐profile instances of
democratic innovations such as those discussed above.
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